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Abstract 
 
 Solving criminal justice problems typically requires the enactment of new 
rules or the modification of existing ones. But there are some serious problems 
that can best be solved simply by altering the way in which the existing rules are 
drafted rather than by altering their content. This is the case with two of the 
most serious problems in criminal justice today: the problem of overlapping 
criminal offenses that create excessive prosecutorial charging discretion and the 
problem of legislative inconsistency and irrationality in grading offenses. 
 After examining these two problems and demonstrating their serious 
effects in perverting criminal justice, the essay proposes a particular method of 
drafting criminal offenses – consolidated offense drafting – and then shows how 
this drafting approach is the best and perhaps the only effective means of solving 
the problems. Potential political resistance to the proposal is discussed.  
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 Solving criminal justice problems typically requires the enactment of new rules or the 
modification of existing ones. But there are some serious problems that can best be solved 
simply by altering the way in which the rules are drafted rather than by altering their content. 
This is the case with two of the most serious problems in criminal justice today: the problem of 
overlapping criminal offenses that create excessive prosecutorial charging discretion and the 
problem of legislative inconsistency and irrationality in grading offenses and variations of an 
offense. 
 After examining these two problems, this essay proposes a particular method of drafting 
criminal offenses – consolidated offense drafting – and then demonstrates how this drafting 
approach is the best and perhaps the only effective means of solving the problems. 
 
I. The Problem of Excessive Prosecutorial Power Created by Overlapping Offenses 
 
 It is not uncommon in American criminal codes for a single criminal act to violate several 
different criminal statutes. Sometimes this makes good sense: a person who commits murder 
by burning down a house with the victim inside is properly charged and convicted of both 
murder and arson. The killing and the property destruction by fire are separate and distinct 
harms, each of which deserves punishment. 
 Unfortunately, it is commonly the case that American criminal codes contain multiple 
offenses for a single criminal act where the offenses are simply overlapping prohibitions of the 
same bit of wrongdoing. For example, each of the offenses may contain one different 
aggravating factor for the same base harm. An offender who steals a gun from a state museum 
has committed a single wrong. In grading the seriousness of the theft, we may want to take 
special account of the fact that the property stolen belongs to the state, the victim of the 
offense was a museum (a charitable institution), and the item stolen was a firearm; but it hardly 
makes sense for the law to treat the person as having committed three (or more) separate 
offenses by allowing the thief to be charged under multiple overlapping statutes: the general 
theft statute, which probably has different grades based upon the value of the property; a 
special theft of state property offense; a special theft from museum offense; and a special theft 
of firearm offense. 
 
A. Examples of Overlapping Offenses 
 
 Yet these kinds of overlapping offenses are common in American criminal codes. For 
example, in Federal law the proliferation of interrelated fraud offenses makes it a regular 
practice for a defendant accused of participation in a single scheme to be charged with a 
handful of overlapping offenses. In August 2019 the Department of Justice charged Michael 
Hild with wire fraud,1 bank fraud,2 securities fraud,3 and conspiracy4 to commit all three 
offenses for orchestrating a scheme to deceive lenders (including a bank) to Live Well Financial, 
 
1 18 U.S. Code § 1343 (carrying a maximum sentence of 30 years where, as here, the fraud “affects a financial 
institution”). 
2 18 U.S. Code § 1344 (carrying a maximum sentence of 30 years). 
3 See 15 U.S. Code §§ 78j (defining violation by reference to 17 Code of Federal Regulations § 240.10b-5), 78ff(a) 
(criminal penalties, including maximum sentence of 20 years). 
4 18 U.S. Code § 1349. 
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of which Mr. Hild was CEO, by inflating the value of the company’s bond portfolio.5 The fact 
that a bank was affected aggravated Mr. Hild’s situation both by allowing a bank fraud charge 
and increasing the maximum sentence of his wire fraud charge.6  
Indeed, the Department of Justice had even more fraud offenses available that it could 
have charged: the federal criminal code’s general offense for “Frauds and swindles” (which, like 
wire fraud, would have carried an aggravated maximum sentence of 30 years because the fraud 
“affect[ed] a financial institution”);7 and a Title 18 “Securities and Commodities Fraud” offense 
(carrying a maximum sentence of 25 years) that (as to registered securities) is coextensive with 
the Title 15 offense under which Mr. Hild was charged.8 
The Model Penal Code, promulgated in 1962 by the American Law Institute, created a 
modern criminal code format that significantly reduced such overlapping offenses.9 And the 
three-quarters of the states that recodified their criminal codes in the following several decades 
generally adopted this non-overlapping approach.10 Unfortunately, as these Model Code 
jurisdictions created new offenses or added new grading distinctions for an offense, they 
typically did so not by integrating the refinement into the existing offense structure but rather 
by creating an entirely new offense. That is, they layered the new offense or new offense 
grading factor on top of the existing offense structure.11 This unfortunate legislative habit re-
created the problem of overlapping offenses in even the modern Model Penal Code-based 
jurisdictions. And, of course, in non-model Penal Code jurisdictions, there was rarely any effort 
to avoid the creation of overlapping offenses. 
 
5 See Former CEO of Live Well Financial Charged in $140 Million Bond Fraud Scheme, Department of Justice Press 
Release (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-ceo-live-well-financial-charged-140-million-bond-fraud-scheme; 
United States v. Michael Hild, Indictment Document, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/press-
release/file/1198561/download. 
6 In parallel proceedings, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Mr. Hild under various civil anti-fraud 
provisions for the same scheme, seeking a permanent injunction, financial penalties, and an officer and director 
bar against him. See SEC Charges Private Lender and CEO with Fraudulent Mismarking Scheme, Securities and 
Exchange Commission Press Release (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2019/lr24579.htm; 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Live Well Financial, Inc. and others, Complaint Document 
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2019/comp24579.pdf. 
7 18 U.S. Code § 1341. 
8 18 U.S. Code § 1348. Furthermore, if the acts underlying Mr. Hild’s wire fraud charge had been his second such 
act within ten years, those acts would form a “pattern of racketeering activity” opening Mr. Hild up to racketeering 
charges. See 18 U.S. Code §§ 1962(c) (defining offense), 1961(1)(B) (defining “racketeering activity” to include 
conduct indictable as wire fraud under 18 U.S. Code § 1343) & (5) (defining “pattern of racketeering activity”), 
carrying a maximum sentence of 20 years, 18 U.S. Code § 1963. The same conduct may also expose a defendant to 
punitive enforcement actions by government agencies. For example, where securities fraud is involved, a 
defendant is usually also exposed to parallel enforcement for the same conduct by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission—which, although technically engaged in civil enforcement, wields punitive measures such as fines, 
permanent injunctions, and various types of bars in addition to purely remedial measures such as disgorgement of 
ill-gotten gains and restitution. 
9 Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense 
Grading, 100(3) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 709, 711-712 (2010) (hereinafter The Modern Irrationalities). 
10Id. at 711; Paul H. Robinson, The Rise and Fall and Resurrection of American Criminal Codes, U. Louisville L. Rev. 
173, 173 (2015) (hereinafter The Resurrection). 
11 Paul h. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56(4) Hastings 
L. J. 633, 635-644 (2005) (hereinafter The Accelerating Degradation). 
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 The extent of such layered-on additions is enormous, and accelerating.12 For example, it 
is not uncommon today for Model Penal Code jurisdictions to have codes that are four, five, or 
six times longer than their original Model Code-based code.13 As the number of new criminal 
statutes has increased, so too has the problem of overlapping offenses.  
 For example, Mark Farmer, a 36-year-old convicted felon from Kentucky, was arrested 
with a defaced sawed-off shotgun in his possession. He was charged14 with both possession of a 
defaced firearm (a class A misdemeanor punishable by three months to one year in prison and 
fines),15 and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (a class D felony punishable by one to 
five years in prison and fines).16 Had he been arrested with that weapon in his pocket on a 
school’s campus, he could have been prosecuted under two additional offenses: carrying a 
concealed deadly weapon (a class A misdemeanor),17 and unlawful possession of a weapon on 
school property (a class D felony).18 Nothing in Kentucky’s penal code appears to prohibit 
finding such an offender guilty of all four of these offenses.19 There are not four separate 
wrongdoings here but rather a single wrongdoing with four different factors that should each 
be taken into account to determine its overall seriousness.  
Similarly, in Delaware, a person who recklessly inflicts bodily injury upon an elderly 
person who suffers from a mental or physical disability, by hitting him with a car, may be 
charged with vehicular assault in the third degree (a class B misdemeanor punishable by up to 
six months in prison, besides fine and restitution),20 abuse of an adult who is impaired (a class A 
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison, in addition to other penalties),21 and a 
crime against a vulnerable adult (a class G felony, punishable by up to two years in prison).22 
There is nothing in Delaware’s criminal code that would seem to prohibit conviction for all 
three offenses.  
In New Jersey, a person who provides an arrestee with a tool to help him escape from a 
detention facility may be prosecuted for escape implements,23 permitting or facilitating 
escape24 (both crimes of the third degree, punishable by three to five years in prison and a 
fine), and obstructing administration of the law (a crime of the fourth degree if the offender 
obstructs the detection, investigation or prosecution of another, punishable by a maximum 18 
months in prison and a fine).25 
 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 635-636. See also Paul H. Robinson, Matthew Kussmaul, Ilya Rudyak, and Criminal Law Research Group, 
Criminal Law, Report of the Delaware Criminal Law Recodification Project 114-115 and 400-402 (2017), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1746)  (hereinafter Delaware Report). 
14Matthew DeVault, Rosine Man Faces Defaced Weapon, Drug Related Charges, 14 News (Jun. 8, 2019), 
https://www.14news.com/2019/06/08/rosine-man-faces-defaced-weapon-drug-related-charges/ 
15 KRS 527.050. 
16 KRS 527.040. 
17 KRS 527.020. 
18 KRS 527.070. 
19 KRS 505.020. 
20 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 628.  
21 Del. Code Ann. tit. 31, § 3913.  
22 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1105. 
23 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-6. 
24 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-5. 
25 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-1. 
 
5 
 
 
In Illinois, if a person possesses a motor vehicle valued at $50,000, knowing it has been 
stolen from a police department in the state, he may be prosecuted for theft (a class 1 felony, 
because the theft is of governmental property that exceeds $10,000 but not $100,000, 
punishable by four to fifteen years in prison and up to $25,000 fine),26 unlawful possession of a 
stolen motor vehicle (a class 2 felony, punishable by three to seven years in prison, and up to 
$25,000 fine),27 and aggravated possession of a motor vehicle (a class 1 felony).28 Illinois' 
criminal code permits prosecution of multiple offenses violated by the same conduct, and does 
not prevent convictions for all of these offenses.29 It was left to the courts to develop doctrines 
that might limit conviction for multiple overlapping offenses.30 
 
B. Why Are Overlapping Offenses Problematic? 
 
Such overlapping offenses are problematic for a variety of reasons. First, they 
undermine the rule of law. While it is properly for the legislature to define what conduct is 
criminal and the relative seriousness of each offense, multiple overlapping offenses essentially 
transfer that criminalization and grading authority to the discretion of the prosecutor (and 
sometimes to the court). The prosecutor is free to pick which of the overlapping offenses she 
will charge, and thus which offense grade will apply. (Most criminal codes, and essentially all 
modern codes, have a system of offense grading, such as first-degree felony, second-degree 
felony, etc., with a maximum authorized sentence attached to each offense grade.31) Or, the 
prosecutor may decide ad hoc to charge any combination of the multiple overlapping offenses. 
Second, overlapping offenses create the danger of punishment beyond what is deserved 
if the prosecutor chooses to prosecute several or all of the available offenses. In the examples 
above, no one would suggest that punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the offense 
conduct can be reached by treating each of the overlapping offenses as an independent wrong 
with the offender punished separately for each of them. What we are left with when a 
prosecutor takes the multiple-overlapping-offense path is the very messy task of trying to have 
a sentencing judge disentangle the extent of the overlap. 
A few jurisdictions adopted a statutory provision like Model Penal Code section 1.07, 
which prevents conviction for certain multiple related offenses;32 but even in these minority 
jurisdictions, the statutory provision will be of limited help to a sentencing judge. Most of its 
provisions prevent conviction for multiple related offenses different than those creating the 
 
26 720 ILCS 5/16-1. 
27 625 ILCS 5/4–103(a)(1). 
28 625 ILCS 5/4–103.2(a)(6). 
29 720 ILCS 5/3-3. 
30 See, e.g., People v. Harvey, 211 Ill.2d 368 (2004), in which the state's Supreme Court reversed the conviction of 
the defendant of four counts of unlawful possession of stolen motor vehicle, as the possession of the four vehicles 
constituted one count of aggravated possession.  
31 See, e.g., 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 106, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.21-12.35, or Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 4205. 
32 See Model Penal Code § 1.07 comment pages 101-136. Similarly, several jurisdictions attempt to address the 
problem of overlapping offenses by statutorily adopting, in their penal codes, the double jeopardy rule, according 
to which a defendant may not be convicted of greater and lesser included offenses for the same underlying 
conduct. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 206 (Delaware), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-8 (New Jersey), and Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 505.020 (Kentucky).  
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problems described above. For example, it prevents conviction for both the substantive offense 
and an inchoate offense toward that substantive offense,33 prevents conviction for offenses 
that require inconsistent findings of fact,34 and prevents conviction for both an offense and a 
lesser included offense.35 But these multiple-offense limitations do not avoid the problem of 
overlapping offenses. The troublesome overlap that we discussed here are instances where, for 
example, each of two offenses focus on a different aggravating factor. Neither is a lesser 
included offense of the other: they are distinct, but overlapping, offenses. 
Another reason judicial discretion cannot solve the overlapping offense problem is that 
judges commonly have limited and inflexible tools at their disposal. They can convict for only 
one, instead of both, of the overlapping offenses; but that has the effect of completely ignoring 
the part of the dismissed offense that is not part of the overlap. For example, where two 
offenses each focus on a different aggravating factor, one of the aggravating factors will now be 
entirely ignored. Alternatively, the judge could allow conviction for both offenses but then have 
the sentences run concurrently. But again, that completely ignores the non-overlapping part of 
the offenses. Each aggravating factor ought to provide some additional weight to the 
sentence.36 Or, the judge could have the sentences run consecutively; but that invites excessive 
punishment by treating the two offenses as if they were entirely separate, thereby 
exaggerating their collective wrongfulness.37 Further, doctrines running contrary to the 
principle of blameworthiness proportionality, such as mandatory minimum sentences, cabin 
judicial discretion even more, and restrict judges' ability to alleviate the disproportional results 
created by the problem of overlapping offenses.  
The larger point here is that any judicial exercise of discretion as a means of solving the 
problem is just another mode by which the legislative role of determining the proper grading 
for an offense may be usurped. The legislative role is here being usurped by the judge rather 
than the prosecutor. It is the legislature that should be making the grading judgment as to what 
grading factors are more serious or less serious, or whether some factors ought to merge, while 
other factors ought not. 
Third, the use of overlapping offenses creates an inappropriate power for prosecutors to 
use threats of excessive punishment to extract plea bargains. Charging the offender with four 
separate offenses that substantially overlap with one another threatens enormous total liability 
exposure, an exposure far beyond the amount of liability and punishment that the offender 
deserves. It is the overlapping nature of the offenses that creates the exposure to excessive 
 
33 Model Penal Code § 1.07(1)(b). 
34 Model Penal Code § 1.07(1)(c). 
35 Model Penal Code § 1.07(1)(a)&(4). 
36 A clever judge might try to game the system by giving concurrent sentences but increasing the sentence length 
of the more serious offense in order to take into account the aggravating factor that is the focus of the other 
offense (with a concurrent term). But, setting aside the obvious problem of disparity among judges, it would be 
difficult to justify a system with such a lack of transparency as an acceptable solution to the overlap problem. 
37 The federal sentencing guidelines provide a mechanism to somewhat reduce the extent of the ‘consecutive-
versus-concurrent’ problem. The federal guidelines have each offense count for something, but increasingly less, 
for each additional offense, with offenses ordered with the most serious first. See US Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual §5G1.2, https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/%C2%A75G1.2. But even if this solution to the consecutive-
concurrent problem is adopted, there still remains a problem with overlapping offenses. The additional 
overlapping offenses will trigger some additional penalty under the federal guidelines approach, when in fact no 
additional penalty is appropriate because there is no separate harm or wrongdoing in the overlapping offenses. 
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liability and punishment, yet it is this very threat of excessive punishment the gives the 
prosecutor the leverage to get a “better” plea. 
One might argue that this excessive power simply makes it easier for a prosecutor to get 
a plea to an offense that best matches her perception of the offender’s deserved punishment. 
But this sort of outsized power disconnects the plea process from the actual facts of the case 
and ties it more to the peculiarity of the offense overlaps that exist in that area of law. Ideally, 
under a criminal code without overlapping offenses, the plea bargaining and its result would 
depend, and rightfully so, on the perceived strength that counsels make of their case and their 
perception of the risks of going to trial. However, the existence of overlapping offenses in the 
code changes the process of plea bargaining significantly, as its result would depend also on the 
prosecutor's ability to threaten conviction for multiple overlapping offense that would seriously 
overpunish the offender. Further, it substitutes the prosecutor’s judgment about the 
seriousness of the offense for the judgment of the legislature (as well as for the judgment of 
the judge and jury). 
Fourth, the use of overlapping offenses and the prosecutorial discretion that necessarily 
follows inevitably creates disparity in the treatment of similar cases. Different prosecutors can 
have different judgments about the relative seriousness of different offenses or the deserved 
punishment of different offenders. The discretion that overlapping offenses give to the 
prosecutor essentially ensures that there will be disparity in the treatment of similar offenders 
according to an offender’s good or bad luck in the prosecutor she gets. 
Fifth, a practice of multiple overlapping offenses also undercuts the rule of law by 
making law so complex and obscure that even those who want to know the law will have 
difficulty learning it. In a nonoverlapping code, like the Model Penal Code, even a high school 
student could look at the table of contents and find the particular offense definition that 
applies to the conduct they have a question about, and that provision will both define the 
offense and specify the grade of the offense or each distinct suboffense. But in today’s codes, it 
is a nearly impossible task for any nonprofessional to find and reconcile the many overlapping 
offenses scattered across different places in the criminal code and commonly even outside of 
the criminal code. And even the professionals can’t know the law without the assistance of 
research and compilation services from companies like Lexis or Westlaw and, often, a 
significant investment of time. 
Finally, this same ignorance of the law problem applies to legislators, sometimes with 
even more dire results. When proposing new legislation, it would seem essential for a legislator 
to know what law already exists on the subject. Is the proposed offense conduct already 
covered? In proposing the offense grade for the new offense, what grade would match the 
legislative grading judgments of the existing related offenses? A legislator cannot have this 
critical information without knowing current law, but the current state of American criminal 
codes, with scattered multiple overlapping offenses, makes it unrealistic that a legislature can 
obtain this basic information without commissioning a major research project.38 And legislative 
 
38 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson and Criminal Law Research Group, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Report on 
Offense Grading in Pennsylvania 16 (2009), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/295 
(hereinafter Pennsylvania Report); Paul h. Robinson et al., Report on Offense Grading In New Jersey 12 (2011), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/340 (hereinafter New Jersey Report). 
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drafting in ignorance of current law regularly produces inconsistent and irrational offense 
grading as illustrated in the next Part. 
II. The Problem of Legislative Inconsistency and Irrationality in Offense Grading 
 
 Most people would agree that, other things being equal, more serious offenses should 
be punished more severely than less serious offenses.39 Modern criminal codes help legislators 
follow this principle by creating a system of offense grades, as noted previously. A grading 
scheme allows legislators to test the accuracy of their relative seriousness judgments by asking, 
for example: Are all of the offenses categorized as third-degree felonies generally of the same 
level of seriousness? Are they all less serious than second-degree felonies and more serious 
than fourth-degree felonies? 
 Even non-modern codes that do not use an offense grading scheme presumably want 
consistency and rationality in setting the maximum penalties for offenses, which will put each 
offense in its appropriate ordinal rank as against all other offenses: offenses with a ten-year 
maximum sentence ought to be more serious than offenses with a seven-year maximum 
sentence and less serious than offenses with a thirteen-year maximum sentence. 
 Judging the relative seriousness of each offense must take account of the relative 
seriousness of its harm or evil as against that of other offenses, for example: How damaging 
was the injury? What was the value of the property stolen or destroyed? What was the extent 
of the risk created? How many people were affected? How important was the governmental 
function impaired? Offense grading also may take account of culpability factors: assigning a 
higher offense grade for a higher culpability level in committing the same offense conduct. 
Most famously, purposeful or knowing killing may be murder, which is graded higher than a 
reckless killing, which is manslaughter, which is graded higher than a negligent killing, which is 
negligent homicide.40 Offense grading may also take account of a wide variety of other offense 
characteristics that, in the legislature’s view, affect the overall seriousness of the offense—for 
example: whether the victim is a member of a particularly vulnerable class of persons; whether 
the offender is of a particular status, such as a public official; whether the offender and victim 
have a particular relationship, such as parent and child; whether the offense was committed in 
a particularly heinous or egregious way; whether the offender had committed the offense 
previously; or whether hatred of a class-characteristic of the victim motivated the offender’s 
action. 
 Yet, despite the consensus that criminal codes should grade an offense according to its 
relative seriousness as against all other offenses, the unfortunate truth is that American 
criminal codes generally do a poor job in this regard. The problems are most common and most 
serious in those jurisdictions that have failed to adopt a modern offense grading scheme. 
 
A. Non-Modern Code Jurisdictions 
 
 
39 Andrew Von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 Crime & Justice 55, 76-77 (1992); Jesper 
Ryberg, The Ethics of Proportionate Punishment (2004); Michael Tonry, Proportionality Theory in Punishment 
Philosophy: Fated for the Dustbin of Otiosity?, in Of One-Eyed and Toothless Miscreants: Making the Punishment 
Fit the Crime? 1, 4-5 (Michael Tonry ed., 2019).  
40 See, e.g., Model Penal Code article 210. 
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A common problem in this regard is assigning different grades to offenses involving 
similar conduct, for no rational reason. For example, according to the California Penal Code, if 
an assault is committed against a parking control officer, the offense is punishable by a 
maximum term of six months in prison.41 However, if the assault is committed against a 
highway worker, the maximum punishment would go up to one year in prison.42 It is unclear 
why these two cases should have these relative maximum punishments.  
Federal criminal law is a rich source of inconsistencies. While destroying religious 
property carries a maximum punishment of three years in prison,43 destroying a veterans’ 
memorial statue is punishable by up to ten years in prison.44 There seems little justification for 
the latter to have a maximum sentence more than three times greater than the former.  
Grading similar offenses differently is one sort of grading irrationality, but the reverse 
sort of irrationality is also common: grading meaningfully different cases the same. Under 
California law, for example, the omission of a parent to furnish necessary clothing for her child45 
has the same maximum punishment as the complete abandonment of the child by the parent.46 
Both are punishable by a maximum of one year in county jail. Strangely, the maximum fine in 
the former case is twice that of the latter. Similarly, physically injuring a juror and trying to 
corruptly influence a juror has the same legislative maximum penalty of ten years under the 
federal criminal code, because both kinds of conduct are included in the same broadly worded 
offense.47 
Grading irrationalities are rampant in non-modern code jurisdictions. Examples provided 
here are the tip of the iceberg. 
 
B. Modern Code Jurisdictions 
 
Unfortunately, the same kinds of inconsistencies and irrationalities are not uncommon 
even in modern code jurisdictions, which typically have offense grading schemes. Inconsistent 
grades are often assigned to offenses of similar seriousness. In Pennsylvania, for example, 
unauthorized administration of an intoxicant with the intent to rape48 is a specific instance of 
the offense of attempted rape;49 yet the former is punishable by up to seven years in prison, 
while the latter carries a maximum sentence of twenty years – nearly three times the penalty. 
In Delaware, the offense of sexual extortion is a class E felony (maximum five years in prison),50 
but is defined so broadly that it encompasses both sexual contact and sexual intercourse—the 
conduct forming the offenses of unlawful sexual contact in the third degree on the one hand, 
and various degrees of rape on the other.51 Furthermore, both unlawful sexual contact and 
 
41 Cal. Penal Code § 241(b). 
42 Cal. Penal Code § 241.5. 
43 18 U.S. Code § 247. 
44 18 U.S. Code § 1369. 
45 Cal. Penal Code § 270. 
46 Cal. Penal Code § 271. 
47 18 U.S. Code § 1503. 
48 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2714 (2009). 
49 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3121(4), 905 (2009). 
50 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 774. 
51 Compare id. (“A person is guilty of sexual extortion when the person intentionally compels or induces another 
person to engage in any sexual act involving contact, penetration or intercourse“) (emphasis added) with 11 Del. 
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rape require the conduct to be “without consent,”52 which, in turn, is defined to include the 
very kinds of threats that comprise the “extortion” in the sexual extortion offense.53 But 
unlawful sexual contact is graded as a class A misdemeanor, and rape is graded anywhere from 
a class C felony (maximum fifteen years in prison) to a class A felony (life imprisonment), 
depending upon the precise circumstances. In other words, a sexual extortion charge is always 
either disproportionately too serious, or not serious enough, when compared with the 
coextensive alternative offenses. Similarly, escaping from prison in Illinois is graded less 
seriously than a prisoner’s mere possession of a tool that may be used to escape from prison— 
thereby grading a preparatory step that may not rise to the level of attempt more harshly than 
the completed offense.54  
As noted above, grading irrationalities commonly arise when offenses with a single 
grade are defined so broadly that acts of materially divergent seriousness are improperly 
punished as though they were the same. This kind of irrationality occurs even in modern codes. 
The law of theft in Kentucky, for example, sets a single “cut-off” level of $300 to distinguish 
between the two grades of the offense, no matter what property is involved55 – meaning that 
theft of $400 is graded the same as theft of $4,000,000.  
Similarly, the offense of committing a second sex offense in Pennsylvania is defined so 
broadly as to include both a second conviction for raping another by force and a second 
conviction for displaying obscene materials in public: both courses of conduct carry a minimum 
sentence of 25 years in prison.56 In Delaware, the general offense for property damage, 
“criminal mischief,” has only one felony grade: a Class G felony for $5,000 or more in resulting 
damage.57 As a result, intentionally destroying the Statue of Liberty (were it located in 
Delaware) would be subject to the same punishment as theft of $1,500, issuing a $1,500 bad 
check, or causing $1,501 in property damage by an act of graffiti.58  
Additionally, many modern codes apply grading factors inconsistently among different 
offenses, with bizarre results. In Delaware, the age of the offender is taken into account for 
rape, but not sexual assault.59 Under this scheme, a person who sexually assaults a 12-year-old 
child is treated the same regardless of whether the offender is another 12-year-old, or an 
adult.60 In Pennsylvania, the general offense of theft makes grading distinctions according to 
 
Code § 767 (“A person is guilty of unlawful sexual contact . . . when the person has sexual contact with another 
person”) and §§ 770-73 (“A person is guilty of rape . . . when the person: . . . intentionally engages in sexual 
intercourse with another person”). 
52 See 11 Del. Code §§ 767, 770(a)(3)a., 771(a)(2)a., 772(a)(1) and (a)(2)a., 773(a)(1) and (a)(2). 
53 Compare 11 Del. Code § 761(k) (“‘Without consent’ means: (1) The defendant compelled the victim to submit by 
any act of coercion as defined in §§ 791 and 792 of this title“) and § 791(1)-(8) with § 774(1)-(7).   
54 720 ILCS 5/31-6(b) (escape; Class 2 felony); 5/31A-1.1(i) (possession; Class 1 felony). 
55 See KRS 514.130. 
56 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9718.2 (2009). 
57 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 811(b)(1). 
58 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 900 (issuing a bad check); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 841(c)(1) (theft); Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11, § 812(a)(2) (graffiti and possession of graffiti implements). 
59 Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 770–73 with Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 767–69. 
60 Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 771(a)(1) (providing a higher grade of rape where the victim is less than 14 
years of age, and the offender is at least 19 years of age), 773(a)(5) (providing an even higher grade of rape where 
victim is less than 12 years of age, and the offender is at least 18 years of age) with Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 769(a)(3) (providing a higher grade of unlawful sexual assault where the victim is less than 13 years of age, 
regardless of the offender’s age). Note also that the relevant age of the victim — less than 12 or less than 13 years 
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the value of the property stolen: under $50 (3rd degree misdemeanor), $50 to $199.99 (2nd 
degree misdemeanor), $200 to $2,000 (1st degree misdemeanor), and $2,000 or more (3rd 
degree felony).61 In contrast, the similar offense of library or museum theft also makes grading 
distinctions according to the value of the property stolen, but uses different monetary cutoffs 
and makes fewer distinctions: less than $150 (summary offense), and $150 or more (3rd degree 
misdemeanor).62 As a result, stealing property valued at $40 is punishable with a maximum of 
one year if stolen from an individual, but is punishable by a maximum of 90 days if stolen from 
a library, and stealing a rare book valued at $3,000 is punishable by up to seven years if stolen 
from an individual, but only one year if stolen from a library. 
 
C. What Causes Offense Grading Irrationalities? 
 
 One may wonder why such irrationalities and inconsistencies are so common in 
American criminal codes, especially modern codes built upon an offense-grading scheme. The 
primary cause lies in the dynamics of American crime politics. 
 When a state’s criminal laws are being codified or recodified in a single project, it is 
natural at some point in the process to sort all of the offenses into their appropriate grading 
categories. (Of course, the minority of states without modern criminal codes have probably 
never undertaken this comparative classification project so it is no surprise to find great 
irrationality and inconsistency in those jurisdictions.) Thus, when a new criminal code is 
enacted, the code tends to have well-considered grading judgments among its offenses. The 
grading problems arise as those jurisdictions add new offenses over time, some criminalizing 
new conduct and some introducing a new offense that is a variation on an existing offense (for 
example, creating the special offense of assault of a fireman that provides greater maximum 
punishment than the general assault offense). Hundreds of new offenses are added with little 
regard for their relative seriousness to existing offenses.63 
 Bad offense grading judgments for new offenses occur for several reasons. First, the 
new legislation is commonly a response to a case in media headlines, or some other triggering 
event has upset some constituents and motivated lawmakers to show that they are responsive 
to their constituents’ concerns. The newspapers report an incident in which an offender has 
stolen a car while the driver was in it. Despite the fact that this conduct is already criminalized 
and carries a serious penalty, a new offense – “carjacking” – is enacted.64 Unfortunately, this 
kind of “crime du jour” political dynamic tends to have the natural effect of exaggerating the 
seriousness of the offense because people are worked up at the moment about that particular 
conduct. The offense grade that seems appropriate in the heat of the moment stands out a 
 
of age — varies between the two sets of offenses, but it is not clear that these different distinctions are 
meaningful, or whether the Delaware General Assembly was even aware of this apparent discrepancy. 
61 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3902, 3903 (2009) (consolidated theft provisions). 
62 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3921.1 (2009). 
63 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Report, supra note 38, at 13 (2,331 criminal offense-related amendments to the 
Pennsylvania Crimes Code between 1972 and 2009); New Jersey Report, supra note 38, at 20 (863 criminal 
offense-related amendments to the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice between 1979 and 2011), and Appendix E 
(charting the number of amendments over time). 
64 See Federal Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 102 H.R. 4542 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2119).  By 2008, nearly half of the 
states enacted similar carjacking statutes.  See National Conference of State Legislators, Auto Theft & Carjacking 
State Statutes, https://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/FSLautotheftpptchart.pdf. 
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year later as seriously out of line with other related offenses, but there is little political 
incentive to go back and correct the exaggeration. (And, unfortunately, the exaggeration can 
provide a new baseline for the next crime-du-jour grading judgment.)65 
 A second common source of bad grading judgments is legislative ignorance about 
existing offense grades of related offenses. That is, even if a legislator sought to be more 
deliberate and to consider the new offense from a larger perspective that takes account of the 
offense grades of related existing offenses, it may be difficult if not impossible for the legislator 
to see the bigger picture, as noted in Part I.66 Once the original codification or recodification is 
muddied with new offenses being layered on top rather than integrated into it, it is a major 
research task to even find all of the existing related offenses, let alone to get a picture of a 
coherent grading plan that ties them together. 
 This may explain why grading irrationalities are getting worse, at an accelerating rate.67 
The messier the code becomes and the more grading irrationalities accumulate, the more 
difficult it is for even the conscientious legislator to find a coherent larger grading picture into 
which he or she can fit the new offense or offense variation. 
  To summarize, the crime-du-jour dynamic of American crime politics means that many 
legislators simply don’t focus on getting the offense grade correct because their overriding 
concern is showing their constituents that they are responsive to the apparent problem at 
hand. If the legislators do focus on grading, their tendency will be to exaggerate it because of 
the heat of current public concern. But even if they try to grade the new offense to fit the larger 
grading pattern in existing law for related offenses, it may be difficult to pull that information 
together. And, if they are successful in collecting this information, they may well discover that 
grading consistency has already been so compromised that they are left with little or no 
rational guidance. 
 
III. The Solution: “Consolidated Offense Drafting” 
 
 One might assume that the problems of overlapping offenses and inconsistent offense 
grading are intractable. Their solution seems to demand fundamental structural changes to the 
allocation of power and discretion on matters relating to criminal justice. How could we 
realistically eliminate prosecutorial discretion in the charging decision? How could we 
realistically constrain the legislative desire to be responsive to the crime du jour? 
 Interestingly, there is a realistic and workable means of reducing these problems 
without such dramatic – and perhaps unreachable – structural changes. The solution is possible 
because, rather than trying to limit the power of prosecutors and legislators generally, it aims at 
the dynamic that creates the problem and seeks to channel the prosecutorial and legislative 
power rather than to eliminate or reduce it. The solution we propose is to use a particular 
method of defining offenses, what might be called consolidated offense drafting. Once a 
jurisdiction takes the step of codifying its criminal law in this format, the problems of excessive 
prosecutorial power from overlapping offenses and irrational and inconsistent offense grading 
by subsequent legislative amendment should be dramatically reduced. 
 
65 The Modern Irrationalities, supra note 9, at 734-73; The Resurrection, supra note 10, at 181. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 38. 
67 The Accelerating Degradation, supra note 11, at 644-645. 
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 The basic principle of consolidated offense drafting is to collect in one offense definition 
all of the offenses relating to a particular kind of wrongdoing that at present may be scattered 
across the criminal code (and beyond in many different offenses). All offenses relating to theft, 
for example, including all those carrying different maximum sentences or grading classifications 
because of special factors – for example, aggravations relating to the particular nature of the 
property or the status of the victim or the criminal history of the offender – would be brought 
together into a single theft offense definition. That provision would not only define the basic 
offense but also provide in its grading subsection the particular variations that would qualify for 
each different offense grade. 
 To illustrate the consolidated-offense-drafting technique, consider proposed 
formulations for two common offenses, reckless injuring and tampering with public records, 
that were drafted to “consolidate” a host of related and often overlapping offenses.  
 
Reckless Injuring 
(a) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he or she recklessly causes 
physical injury to another person. 
(b) Grading. 
(1) If the injury caused is serious physical injury, then the offense is: 
(A) a Class 5 felony if: 
(i) injury is caused by the person’s abuse or neglect of a 
child less than 14 years of age; or 
(ii) the offense results in the unlawful termination of the 
victim’s pregnancy without the victim’s consent; or 
(B) a Class 7 felony in all other cases. 
(2) If the injury caused is physical injury, the offense is: 
(A) a Class 8 felony if the victim is a child less than: 
(i) 4 years of age; or 
(ii) 14 years of age whose intellectual or physical capacity 
discernibly falls outside the normal range of performance and 
behavior with regard to age, development, and environment; or 
(iii) 14 years of age, and physical injury is caused by a 
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; or 
(B) a Class B misdemeanor in all other cases. 
 
This “consolidated” formulation is drawn from a proposal that two of us used in a project to 
recodify Delaware criminal law.68 The eleven existing Delaware statutes that this formulation 
consolidates are reproduced in Appendix A. The consolidated formulation is 172 words in 
length and completely replaces the eleven existing offenses that total 1,485 words.  
 
Tampering with Public Records 
(a) Offense Defined. A person commits an offense if he or she: 
(1) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any writing: 
 
68 Delaware Report, supra note 13, at 114-115 and 400-402.  
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(A) belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for 
information or record; or 
(B) required by law to be kept by others for information of the 
government; or 
(2) knowingly alters, destroys, defaces, removes, or conceals any public 
record or device. 
(b) Grading. The offense is: 
(1) a Class 3 felony if the person is a public official or employee; or 
(2) a Class 4 felony in all other cases. 
 
The thirteen existing Illinois statutes that this formulation consolidates are reproduced in 
Appendix B. The consolidated formulation is 101 words in length, replacing the thirteen existing 
offenses that total 1,688 words.  
The dramatic reduction of code language seen in these two illustrative formulations 
demonstrates how consolidated offense drafting can make criminal codes simpler, clearer, and 
more accessible. This promotes the important interests of fair notice, uniformity in application, 
reduced inconsistency among different statutes, fewer troublesome interpretation issues for 
appellate courts, and a variety of other legality principle interests.69  
For our present purposes, however, the most important effects of the consolidated 
drafting approach is its ability to dramatically reduce or eliminate the problem of excessive 
prosecutorial discretion created by overlapping offenses and the problem of irrational or 
inconsistent offense grading. This is the topic of the next two Parts. 
 One might note that the modern codification format introduced by the Model Penal 
Code in 1962 similarly attempted to provide a criminal code that minimized overlapping 
offenses. Yet that drafting approach led nonetheless to the problems that we have today. Why 
would our proposed consolidated offense drafting do any better?  
We think it would do better, and here’s why. The Model Penal Code was drafted at a 
time when the custom was to have an enormous amount of judicial sentencing discretion. The 
goal of the criminal code at that time was simply to define the elements of the basic offense. 
Few offenses (such as homicide) had a system of grading distinctions within the offense.  
 That world of broad judicial sentencing discretion is long gone. The sentencing 
guidelines movement has done much to constrain, or at least guide, the exercise of judicial 
sentencing discretion. More importantly for our purposes, legislatures have created a cottage 
industry of introducing a continuous and growing stream of offense grading distinctions. The 
result is more ambitious criminal codes that not only define the basic requirements for each 
offense but also set out a variety of grading distinctions that call for juries rather than judges to 
set the extent of liability and punishment. 
 In the old Model Penal Code era, when a legislator wanted to introduce a new grading 
distinction because of the crime-du-jour dynamic, or for any other reason, it was quite natural 
 
69 Delaware Report, supra note 13, at 19-43; Paul H. Robinson and Michael T. Cahill, Final Report of the Illinois 
Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission xx-lx (2003), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/291 (hereinafter Illinois Report);  
Paul H. Robinson and Kentucky Criminal Justice Council staff, Final Report of the Kentucky Penal Code Revision 
Project xxiii-xxxix (2003) 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/294) (hereinafter Kentucky Report). 
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to simply create a new offense that set out the new grading distinction. Most offense 
definitions contained no grading distinctions to which a new distinction could be added.  
Under the new approach of consolidated offense drafting, however, most if not all 
offenses will have a host of grading distinctions already built into the offense formulation. 
Indeed, under the new approach each offense will have an “Offense Defined” section and a 
separate “Grading” section. Now when a legislator wants to introduce a new grading 
distinction, the easy and obvious approach is to add it to the other grading distinctions already 
included in the offense’s “Grading” subsection. 
One might conclude that the consolidated offense drafting proposed here has significant 
advantages in clarity, brevity, accessibility, fair notice, uniformity of application, and other 
virtues of the legality principle. But how does this form of drafting rein in prosecutorial 
overcharging and legislative grading irrationality? That is the subject of the following two Parts. 
 
IV. Restraining Prosecutorial Multiple-Offense Excesses 
 
 Recall the hypothetical at the beginning of Part I involving the theft of a gun from a state 
museum where multiple overlapping statutes allow the thief to be charged with violating a 
variety of offenses: the general theft statute, which probably has different grades based upon 
the value of the property, a special theft of state property offense, a special theft from a 
museum offense, and a special theft of a firearm offense. Under the approach of consolidated 
offense drafting proposed here, no such multiple charges are possible because there is only one 
theft offense. The special characteristics of state property, museum property, firearm, and the 
value of the property are all dealt with in the grading subsection of that single theft offense. 
The grading subsection would make clear what grade of theft is appropriate given this or any 
other particular combination of grading factors.70 
 Consider this consolidation dynamic at work in a few illustrative cases. Charles Dillard is 
a convicted felon from Michigan.71 He was arrested while possessing a nine-millimeter gun 
inside a vehicle and, as a result, was charged with three overlapping offenses based on that 
single course of criminal conduct: a felon in possession of a firearm, carrying a concealed 
weapon, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony.72 The Michigan Court of 
 
70 In addition to the distinctions in a “Grading” subsection, a consolidated offense section can also utilize a 
subsection of “Grade Adjustments” for aggravating factors that, rather than setting a ‘baseline’ for the offense’s 
grade, act to increase the grade of any version of the offense. This allows one consolidated offense section to take 
into account multiple aggravating factors at one time, arriving at one grade for a single course of conduct that 
most closely tracks the seriousness of that individual case. Two of us have used this approach with good results in 
the Delware criminal law recodification project mentioned above. See Delaware Report, supra note 13, at 95-96 
(general grade adjustments), 113 (grade adjustment for assault offense), 120 (grade adjustment for rape and 
sexual assault), and 129 (extortion as a grade adjustment for theft offenses). 
71 He was previously found guilty of assault with intent to murder. The trial court dismissed the third charge, as 
prosecuting him for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in addition to a felon in possession 
infringes upon his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. People v. Dillard, 246 Mich. App 163, 165 
(2001). 
72 The predicate felony in this case for the felony-firearm charge was in fact the felon in possession of a firearm. 
The court cited the language of the felony-firearm statute, and remarked that it criminalizes any person who 
carries a firearm in his possession while committing or attempting to commit a felony except for four exclusive 
felonies enumerated specifically in the felony-firearm statute. Thus, and “because defendant's felon in possession 
charge unquestionably does not constitute one of the explicitly enumerated exceptions to the felony-firearm 
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Appeals, after employing statutory construction rules to track the legislative intent, concluded 
that double jeopardy protection was not offended in the case, and held that conviction for all 
three charges was permissible.73 Under the consolidated offense drafting approach, in contrast, 
Dillard could be neither charged with nor convicted of three separate offenses. Instead, he 
would be charged with one offense of firearm possession, whose grade and maximum 
punishment, according to the grading subsection of the offense, depends on the relevant 
aggravating factors like concealing the firearm, possessing it while committing another felony, 
and the fact that he is a convicted felon.  
Edward McGhee served as a vacant-lots coordinator at project CLEAN. The project was a 
summer youth employment program, funded by the city of Cleveland. McGhee engaged in a 
scam that stole approximately $45,000 from the project. He was charged with a host of 
offenses and, following a bench trial, was convicted of, among other things, grand theft (due to 
the fact that more than $5,000 was stolen), as well as the offense of theft in office. In his appeal 
before the Court of Appeals of Ohio, McGhee challenged his conviction of both offenses on the 
grounds that they are “allied offenses” of similar import, covering the same conduct. The court 
vacated the grand theft conviction, explaining that both statutory offenses are allied, and the 
commission of a theft in office automatically results in the commission of theft, and in this 
particular case the two offenses stem from the same criminal actions by McGhee, with the 
same motive and as part of the same plan.74  
Under the consolidated drafting approach, bringing multiple theft charges against 
McGhee would not have been an option. Instead, he could be charged with a single theft 
offense. The amount of money stolen, the fact that the he used his office in aid of committing 
the offense, besides other characteristics of the case, would determine the appropriate theft 
grade, according to the theft offense’s grading subsection.  
The result provided by the appellate court seems a proper one, but appellate case law is 
not a solution to the problem with multiple overlapping offenses – just as judicial sentencing 
discretion is not, as discussed previously.75 The prosecution still has the improper ability to 
overcharge and threaten excessive liability in order to gain a “better” plea bargain. It still allows 
for the possibility that some courts on some occasions will not properly sort out the 
overlapping liability problem. And, perhaps most importantly, it leaves such criminalization 
decisions to the courts when they are instead appropriately legislative decisions.  
Further, sometimes it is simply not within the reach of appellate court law to properly 
fix the problem. Recall, for example, the case of the theft of a firearm from a museum, where 
the offender is convicted of theft, theft of a firearm, and theft from a museum. The appellate 
court only has the ability to invalidate one or two of the convictions but this does not generate 
the proper result that a consolidated offense drafting provision could provide. Presumably, 
according to the value judgments of this particular jurisdiction, both the firearm factor and the 
museum factor are aggravations. The grading subsection of the theft offense might properly 
 
statute”, the court concluded “that the Legislature clearly intended to permit a defendant charged with felon in 
possession to be properly charged with an additional felony-firearm count.” 72 Id. at 166-168. 
73 Id. at 170-71. 
74 State v. McGhee, 37 Ohio App.3d 54 (1987). 
75 See a similar discussion of judicial sentencing discretion at supra text accompanying notes 32-37. 
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double the aggravation of the theft offense and to aggravating factors present. The appellate 
case law simply cannot reach this result.76 
After seizing his computer and finding hundreds of child pornography images and videos 
on it, Joseph Benoit was indicted in a federal court for two separate offenses: the receipt of 
child pornography and the possession of child pornography. He was found guilty by a jury.77 The 
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and instructed it to vacate one of the 
convictions as the multiple sentences conflicted with the Double Jeopardy Clause, reasoning 
that possession of child pornography is a lesser-included offense of receipt of child 
pornography, as the latter necessarily requires the former, for there is no receiving without 
possession.78 Had the Federal code followed the consolidated offense drafting approach, 
prosecutors would not have been capable of indicting Benoit for two separate offenses. The 
receipt and the possession of child pornography would be part of a single consolidated child 
pornography offense.  
Again, the fact that the federal appellate court avoided one aspect of the overlap 
problem in this case does not solve the problem of multiple overlapping offenses used for 
leverage in plea bargaining, the possibility that some appellate courts will not fix the overlap 
problem, the fact that this criminalization decision is properly for the legislature not the courts, 
and the fact that appellate courts are limited to invalidating one or another offense and have 
no ability to fashion an appropriate overall liability amount.79 
 
V. Avoiding Irrational Legislative Offense Grading 
 
 The use of consolidated offense drafting also helps solve the problem of irrational or 
inconsistent offense grading by the legislature. First, when a criminal code has adopted this 
drafting approach, legislators contemplating a new offense or adjustment to an existing offense 
grade will no longer have the difficult task of figuring out what current law provides. Instead of 
having to find related offenses that may be scattered across the criminal code and beyond, they 
will find all of the relevant criminal law collected in a single code provision with all of the 
existing grade levels represented in its grading subsection. 
 Further, this collection of all existing grading provisions in one subsection will set an 
obvious continuum of offense seriousness that will be difficult to ignore when assessing the 
appropriate grade for whatever new variation of the offense the legislature wishes to add. 
Legislators are no longer free to simply make up an offense grade in isolation. Under 
consolidated offense drafting, they are forced to make a comparative judgment in setting the 
grade: where on the continuum of current variations contained in the offense grading 
subsection does the proposed new variation fall? 
 
76 Note the similarity between these limitations of appellate case law and the limitations of the sentencing judge in 
the discretionary determination of consecutive versus concurrent sentences, discussed earlier. See supra text 
accompanying notes 32-37. 
77 He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 125 and 120 months, in addition to paying restitution. 
78 United States v. Benoit, 713, F.3d 1 (10th Cir. 2013). In fact, the legislative history demonstrates the possession 
offense was added in 1990 for gap-filling purposes, to enable targeting whoever possessed child pornography 
without having also received it. Since Congress has not expressed any intent to sanction both offenses separately, 
and Benoit was convicted of the receipt and possession offenses based on the same conduct, multiple 
punishments could not stand. Id, at 15. 
79 See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.  
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 Consider several real-world examples. Under federal law, giving or offering a bribe to a 
public official to influence an official act is punishable by up to fifteen years in prison.80 Yet, 
offenses of bribery in a variety of situations, scattered throughout the federal code, carry 
different, inconsistent punishments. A person who endeavors to obstruct a criminal 
investigation by means of bribery could be sentenced to maximum of five years in prison.81 
Giving or offering a bribe to influence inspectors or other employees of the office of any 
supervisor of a harbor is punishable by six months to one year in prison.82 A person who gives a 
bribe in exchange for acting or refraining from acting under title 11, which regulates 
bankruptcy, may face a maximum of five years in prison.83 These irrational differences in 
grading bribery presumably exist because the legislators drafting, and voting for, each bit of 
legislation were unaware of the grades of the other bribery offenses. Consolidated offense 
drafting would quickly and easily highlight the bribery grading in current law, which would in 
turn help avoid inconsistency in grading new variations.  
 Consolidated offense drafting, by making clear the effect of grading factors in one 
offense, can also help avoid adopting a conflicting scheme of grading factors in similar or 
related offenses. For example, whatever grading scheme is used for the general damage to 
property offense, one would logically expect it to bear some relation to the grading scheme 
used in other kinds of damage to property offenses. In Delaware, a person who causes damage 
to property, whether intentionally or recklessly, is guilty of criminal mischief. The offense is 
classified as a class G felony if it is committed intentionally and the amount of monetary loss 
exceeds $5,000 or if it impairs one from a list of essential services. Damage valued at more than 
$1,000, caused intentionally or recklessly, is classified as a class A misdemeanor. Any other 
criminal mischief is an unclassified misdemeanor.84 However, the offense grading of other 
offenses addressing particular property damage in Delaware’s code is highly inconsistent with 
the grading set forth by the criminal mischief offense. An act of graffiti is a class A 
misdemeanor, and it becomes a class G felony if the damage to the property exceeds $1,50085 – 
significantly less than the threshold of class G felony according to the criminal mischief offense. 
The offense of destruction of computer equipment, which criminalizes causing damage to 
equipment used in a computer system,86 inexplicably adopts a different grading scheme, 
contingent upon the amount of damage or the value of the property affected: class D felony if it 
exceeds $10,000; class E felony if it exceeds $5,000; class G felony if it exceeds $1,500; and a 
class A misdemeanor in any other case.87  
 These grading irrationalities presumably exist because, at the time of grading one 
property damage offense, the sponsoring legislator was unaware of the grading scheme for the 
other property damage offenses, or even unaware of the existence of the other property 
damage offenses. By consolidating all property damage offenses and by collecting all of the 
 
80 18 U.S. Code § 201. 
81 18 U.S. Code § 1510. 
82 33 U.S. Code § 447. 
83 18 U.S. Code § 152. 
84 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 811. 
85 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 812. 
86 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 936. 
87 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 939. 
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existing grading schemes in one place, consolidated offense drafting would help avoid such 
irrational inconsistencies. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Many if not most significant criminal justice reforms involve rule changes that may be 
difficult to enact because of conflicting political interests. The rule change may shift the balance 
between other competing interests, such as privacy versus law enforcement effectiveness, and 
on this ground the rule change may be opposed. However, as previous discussions have shown, 
using the proposed change in drafting technique – consolidated offense drafting – can have a 
dramatic effect in improving the criminal justice process even though it requires no change in 
the content of the rules.  
Because the content of the rules is not being changed, only their statutory form, one 
might conclude that this kind of solution to the problems highlighted here would be without 
the political tensions triggered by rule-changing reforms. Unfortunately, the world is not so 
simple or straightforward. One of us has been involved in quite a few state criminal law 
recodification projects and in every one of those projects prosecutors resisted the 
recodification plans,88 all of which involved some form of offense consolidation with little 
change in rule content. Why would prosecutors resist a change in drafting format that does not 
significantly alter the content of the existing statutes? 
 The answer, as signaled by the analysis in Part I, is that prosecutors wish to preserve the 
current chaotic structure of multiple overlapping offenses applicable to a single course of 
conduct. They much value the outsized discretion that overlapping offenses give them. There is 
a slight awkwardness in this position, however, because they can hardly stand up publicly to 
defend what is on its face a disorganized and often impenetrable code. It is not as if any 
legislature ever sought to create a chaotic system of messy, overlapping offenses. The current 
state of affairs is simply the unfortunate effect of decades of criminal law legislation layering 
one new offense or offense variation on top of existing ones. No legislature defends this mess 
as desirable but instead reluctantly lives with it as the unfortunate byproduct of ad hoc 
legislative activity. When a jurisdiction does undertake a general overhaul of its criminal law, as 
three-quarters of the states did after the promulgation of the Model Penal Code in 1962, it 
never perpetuates the kind of messy overlapping offenses system that we have today. Without 
exception, the jurisdictions adopt new criminal code that have as their major hallmark a 
structure of non-overlapping offenses, as provided in the Model Code. 
 
88 See, e.g., Alex Vuocolo, Effort to rewrite Delaware criminal code scrapped, Delaware Business Times (Jun. 8, 
2018), https://www.delawarebusinesstimes.com/delaware-criminal-code-scrapped/ (“Lawmakers have scrapped 
an effort to overhaul Delaware’s criminal code amid criticism from the attorney general. . . . Attorney General Matt 
Denn issued a 30-page document . . . outlining the Department of Justice’s concerns.)“); Delaware Report, supra 
note 13, at 11 (“[T]he Attorney General declined the invitation for his attorneys to participate in the process and 
eventually would not permit them to comment on the Report.  As a result of this decision by the Attorney General, 
no one in the Department of Justice contributed to the Preliminary Report.”); Illinois Report, supra note 69, at xii-
xiii; Kentucky Report, supra note 69, at xx (“[T]he Penal Code Work Group discussed the desire of the prosecutors’ 
representatives to limit the project to proposing amendments to the existing code. Ultimately a majority of the 
Work Group concluded that a general rewrite of the code was the best approach to fulfilling the statutory mandate 
of Penal Code reform. In August 2002, the representatives of the Commonwealth’s Attorneys Association and the 
County Attorneys Association . . . withdrew from the Work Group itself.”). 
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 No doubt prosecutors, in their own minds, justify their opposition to non-overlapping 
recodification on the grounds that it would make their job more difficult, such as by giving them 
less leverage during plea bargaining. And, in their minds, that translates into less justice done 
and less control of crime. However, this view reflects an unfortunate shortsightedness. As social 
science research increasingly shows,89 the long-term crime-control effectiveness of the system 
depends upon enhancing its reputation for being just, so as to promote community support and 
assistance as well as the personal internalization of its norms. A criminal justice system seen as 
regularly unjust will instead provoke resistance and subversion and will increasingly undermine 
its ability to control conduct through social influence and internalized norms. 
 A system of messy, overlapping offenses that shifts criminal liability decisions from a 
criminal code’s unambiguous directives to opaque prosecutorial (and judicial) discretion will 
undermine the system’s moral credibility with the community. While the prosecutor may see 
short-term ease in prosecution, the long-term cost will be reduced crime-control effectiveness. 
The better approach is to adopt criminal codes based upon consolidated offense drafting. 
 
 
89 Paul H. Robinson, Intuitions of Justice and the Utility of Desert 95-236 (2013). 
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Appendix A 
Consolidated Delaware Statutes 
11 Del. Code § 605 Abuse of a pregnant female in the second degree; class C 
felony. 
(a) A person is guilty of abuse of a pregnant female in the second degree when in 
the course of or in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of assault third 
degree or any violent felony against or upon a pregnant female, or while in immediate flight 
therefrom, the person recklessly and without her consent causes the unlawful termination of her 
pregnancy. 
(b) It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the person was 
unaware that the victim was pregnant. 
(c) Prosecution under this section does not preclude prosecution under any other 
section of the Delaware Code. Abuse of a pregnant female in the second degree is a class C 
felony. 
11 Del. Code § 611 Assault in the third degree; class A misdemeanor. 
A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when: 
(1) The person . . . recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or 
. . . 
Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor. 
11 Del. Code § 612 Assault in the second degree; class D felony. 
(a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: 
(1) The person recklessly . . . causes serious physical injury to another person; or 
(2) The person recklessly . . . causes physical injury to another person by means 
of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or 
. . . 
(10) The person recklessly . . . causes physical injury to a pregnant female. It is no 
defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the person was unaware that the victim was 
pregnant; or 
(11) A person who is 18 years of age or older and who recklessly . . . causes 
physical injury to another person who has not yet reached the age of 6 years. In any prosecution 
of a parent, guardian, foster parent, legal custodian or other person similarly responsible for the 
general care and supervision of a child victim pursuant to this paragraph, the State shall be 
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required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any justification offered by § 468(1) 
of this title. In any prosecution of a teacher or school administrator pursuant to this paragraph, 
the State shall be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of any justification 
offered by § 468(2) of this title; or 
(12) The person recklessly . . . causes physical injury to a law-enforcement 
officer, security officer, fire police officer, fire fighter, paramedic, or emergency medical 
technician in the lawful performance of their duties by means of an electronic control device 
shall be a class C felony. 
. . . 
(d) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony. 
11 Del. Code § 628 Vehicular assault in the third degree; class B 
misdemeanor [Transferred]. 
A person is guilty of vehicular assault in the third degree when, while in the 
course of driving or operating a motor vehicle, the person’s criminally negligent driving or 
operation of said vehicle causes physical injury to another person. 
Vehicular assault in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor. 
11 Del. Code § 628A Vehicular assault in the second degree; class A 
misdemeanor. 
A person is guilty of vehicular assault in the second degree when: 
(1) While in the course of driving or operating a motor vehicle, the person’s 
criminally negligent driving or operation of said vehicle causes serious physical injury to another 
person; or 
(2) While in the course of driving or operating a motor vehicle and under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a prohibited alcohol or drug content, as defined by § 4177 
of Title 21, the person’s negligent driving or operation of said vehicle causes physical injury to 
another person. 
Vehicular assault in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. 
11 Del. Code § 629 Vehicular assault in the first degree; class F felony. 
A person is guilty of vehicular assault in the first degree when while in the course 
of driving or operating a motor vehicle and under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a 
prohibited alcohol or drug content, as defined by § 4177 of Title 21, the person’s negligent 
driving or operation of said vehicle causes serious physical injury to another person. 
Vehicular assault in the first degree is a class F felony. 
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11 Del. Code § 1103 Child abuse in the third degree; class A misdemeanor. 
(a) A person is guilty of child abuse in the third degree when: 
(1) The person recklessly or intentionally causes physical injury to a child through 
an act of abuse and/or neglect of such child; or 
(2) The person recklessly . . . causes physical injury to a child when the person 
has engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect of such child. 
(b) This offense shall be a class A misdemeanor. 
11 Del. Code § 1103A Child abuse in the second degree; class G felony. 
(a) A person is guilty of child abuse in the second degree when: 
(1) The person intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to a child who is 
3 years of age or younger; or 
(2) The person intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to a child who 
has significant intellectual or developmental disabilities; 
(3) The person intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to a child by 
means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. 
(b) This offense shall be a class G felony. 
11 Del. Code § 1103B Child abuse in the first degree; class B felony. 
A person is guilty of child abuse in the first degree when the person recklessly or 
intentionally causes serious physical injury to a child: 
(1) Through an act of abuse and/or neglect of such child; or 
(2) When the person has engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect of 
such child. 
Child abuse in the first degree is a class B felony. 
11 Del. Code § 1448 Possession and purchase of deadly weapons by persons 
prohibited; penalties. 
(e) . . . 
(2) Any person who is a prohibited person as described in this section because of 
a conviction for a violent felony and who, while in possession or control of a firearm in violation 
of this section, negligently causes serious physical injury to or the death of another person 
through the use of such firearm, shall be guilty of a class B felony and shall receive a minimum 
sentence of: 
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a. Four years at Level V; or 
b. Six years at Level V, if the person causes such injury or death within 10 years 
of the date of conviction for any violent felony or the date of termination of all periods of 
incarceration or confinement imposed pursuant to said conviction, whichever is the later date; or 
c. Ten years at Level V, if the person has been convicted on 2 or more separate 
occasions of any violent felony. 
d. Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to be a related or included offense of 
any other provision of this Code. Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to preclude 
prosecution or sentencing under any other provision of this Code nor shall this paragraph be 
deemed to repeal any other provision of this Code. 
21 Del. Code § 4134 Operation of vehicles on approach of authorized 
emergency vehicles. 
. . . 
(b) Upon approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle, when the 
authorized emergency vehicle is giving a signal by displaying alternately flashing red, blue, blue 
and white, red and white, red and blue, or red, white and blue lights, or upon approaching a 
stationary authorized vehicle of the Department of Transportation, which is giving a signal by 
displaying alternately flashing amber or red and amber lights, or upon approaching a stationary 
tow truck, which is giving a signal by displaying alternately flashing amber, white, or amber and 
white lights, or upon approaching a stationary vehicle owned or operated by a public utility, 
which is giving a signal by displaying alternately flashing amber, white, or amber and white 
lights, a person who drives an approaching vehicle shall: 
(1) Proceed with caution and yield the right-of-way by making a lane change into 
a lane not adjacent to that of such vehicle, if possible with due regard to safety and traffic 
conditions, if on a roadway having at least 4 lanes with not less than 2 lanes proceeding in the 
same direction as the approaching vehicle; or, 
(2) Proceed with caution and reduce the speed of the vehicle to a safe speed while 
passing such stationary vehicle, if changing lanes would be impossible or unsafe. 
. . . 
(d) Any person violating subsection (b) of this section who hits, strikes, or in any 
way contacts an emergency responder, causing physical injury, with that person’s vehicle shall 
be guilty of a class F felony. 
  
 
DMEAST #38961980 v1 5 
Appendix B 
Consolidated Illinois Statutes 
720 ILCS 5/32-8 Tampering with public records 
(a) A person commits tampering with public records when he or she knowingly, 
without lawful authority, and with the intent to defraud any party, public officer or entity, alters, 
destroys, defaces, removes or conceals any public record. 
(b) (Blank). 
(c) A judge, circuit clerk or clerk of court, public official or employee, court 
reporter, or other person commits tampering with public records when he or she knowingly, 
without lawful authority, and with the intent to defraud any party, public officer or entity, alters, 
destroys, defaces, removes, or conceals any public record received or held by any judge or by a 
clerk of any court. 
(c-5) “Public record” expressly includes, but is not limited to, court records, or 
documents, evidence, or exhibits filed with the clerk of the court and which have become a part 
of the official court record, pertaining to any civil or criminal proceeding in any court. 
(d) Sentence. A violation of subsection (a) is a Class 4 felony. A violation of 
subsection (c) is a Class 3 felony. . . . 
720 ILCS 5/33E-15 False entries 
(a) An officer, agent, or employee of, or anyone who is affiliated in any capacity 
with any unit of local government or school district commits false entries when he or she makes 
a false entry in any book, report, or statement of any unit of local government or school district 
with the intent to defraud the unit of local government or school district. 
(b) Sentence. False entries is a Class 3 felony. 
10 ILCS 5/29-20  Vote by Mail ballots — violations 
A person is guilty of a Class 3 felony who knowingly: 
. . . 
(4) Marks or tampers with a vote by mail ballot of another person or takes a vote 
by mail ballot of another person in violation of Section 19-6 [10 ILCS 5/19-6] so that an 
opportunity for fraudulent marking or tampering is created. 
10 ILCS 5/29-6 Mutilation of election materials 
Any person who knowingly destroys, mutilates, defaces, falsifies, forges, conceals or removes 
any record, register of voters, affidavit, return or statement of votes, certificate, tally sheet, 
ballot, or any other document or computer program which (a) is used or to be preserved for use 
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in connection with registration, or (b) is used or to be preserved for use in connection with any 
election pursuant to this Code, except as permitted by provisions of this Code, shall be guilty of a 
Class 4 felony and shall also be ineligible for public employment for a period of 5 years 
immediately following the completion of his or her sentence. 
35 ILCS 5/1301 Willful and Fraudulent Acts 
Any person who is subject to the provisions of this Act and who willfully fails to file a return, or 
who files a fraudulent return, or who willfully attempts in any other manner to evade or defeat 
any tax imposed by this Act or the payment thereof, or any accountant or other agent who 
knowingly enters false information on the return of any taxpayer under this Act, shall, in addition 
to other penalties, be guilty of a Class 4 felony for the first offense and a Class 3 felony for each 
subsequent offense. Any person who is subject to this Act and who willfully violates any rule or 
regulation of the Department for the administration and enforcement of this Act or who fails to 
keep books and records as required in this Act is, in addition to other penalties, guilty of a Class 
A misdemeanor. Any person whose commercial domicile or whose residence is in this State and 
who is charged with a violation under this Section shall be tried in the county where his 
commercial domicile or his residence is located unless he asserts a right to be tried in another 
venue. A prosecution for any act in violation of this Section may be commenced at any time 
within 5 years of the commission of that act. 
35 ILCS 130/14 [Penalty] 
Any person required by this Act to keep records of any kind whatsoever, who shall fail to keep 
the records so required or who shall falsify such records, shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. If a 
person fails to produce the records for inspection by the Department upon request, a prima facie 
presumption shall arise that the person has failed to keep the records so required. A person who 
is unable to rebut this presumption is in violation of this Act and is subject to the penalties 
provided in this Section. 
35 ILCS 505/15 [Failure to acquire license; failure to file return; failure to 
make payment; refusal to present books] 
. . . 
3.5. Any person who knowingly enters false information on any supporting documentation 
required to be kept by Section 6 or 6a of this Act [35 ILCS 505/6 or 35 ILCS 505/6a] is guilty of 
a Class 3 felony 
 
205 ILCS 657/90 Enforcement. 
. . . 
(h) A person who engages in conduct requiring a license under this Act and fails 
to obtain a license from the Director or knowingly makes a false statement, misrepresentation, or 
false certification in an application, financial statement, account record, report, or other 
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document filed or required to be maintained or filed under this Act or who knowingly makes a 
false entry or omits a material entry in a document is guilty of a Class 3 felony. 
240 ILCS 40/15-45 Criminal offenses 
. . . 
(c) A person who, knowingly and without lawful authority: 
(1) withholds records from the Department; 
(2) keeps, creates, or files with the Department false, misleading, or inaccurate 
records; 
(3) alters records without permission of the Department; or 
(4) presents to the Department any materially false or misleading records; 
is guilty of a Class 2 felony. 
410 ILCS 535/27 [False statements in reports, records, etc.; transport of 
bodies without permit; penalties] 
(1)  
. . . 
(b) Any person who without lawful authority and with the intent to deceive, 
makes, alters, amends, or mutilates any report, record, or certificate required to be filed under 
this Act or a certified copy of such report, record, or certificate; . . . 
. . . is guilty of a Class 4 felony. 
415 ILCS 5/44 Criminal acts; penalties 
. . . 
(h) Violations; False Statements. 
. . . 
(2) Any person who knowingly makes a false material statement or 
representation in any label, manifest, record, report, permit or license, or other document 
filed, maintained, or used for the purpose of compliance with this Act in connection with the 
generation, disposal, treatment, storage, or transportation of hazardous waste commits a 
Class 4 felony. A second or any subsequent offense after conviction hereunder is a Class 3 
felony. 
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(3) Any person who knowingly destroys, alters, or conceals any record 
required to be made by this Act in connection with the disposal, treatment, storage, or 
transportation of hazardous waste commits a Class 4 felony. A second or any subsequent 
offense after a conviction hereunder is a Class 3 felony. 
(4) Any person who knowingly makes a false material statement or 
representation in any application, bill, invoice, or other document filed, maintained, or used 
for the purpose of receiving money from the Underground Storage Tank Fund commits a 
Class 4 felony. A second or any subsequent offense after conviction hereunder is a Class 3 
felony. 
(4.5) Any person who knowingly makes a false material statement or 
representation in any label, manifest, record, report, permit or license, or other document 
filed, maintained, or used for the purpose of compliance with Title XVI of this Act commits a 
Class 4 felony. Any second or subsequent offense after conviction hereunder is a Class 3 
felony. 
(5) Any person who knowingly destroys, alters, or conceals any record required to be 
made or maintained by this Act or required to be made or maintained by Board or Agency 
rules for the purpose of receiving money from the Underground Storage Tank Fund commits 
a Class 4 felony. A second or any subsequent offense after a conviction hereunder is a Class 
3 felony. 
420 ILCS 40/39 Violations [Repealed effective January 1, 2021] 
. . . 
(b)  
. . . 
(2) A person who knowingly alters a credential, certificate, registration, or 
license issued by the Department of Nuclear Safety or its successor agency, the Illinois 
Emergency Management Agency, for the purpose of evading a requirement of this Act is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense and is guilty of a Class 4 felony for a 
second or subsequent offense. 
625 ILCS 5/5-402.1 Use of Secretary of State Uniform Invoice for Essential 
Parts. [Effective January 1, 2020] 
. . . 
(f) Except for scrap processors, any person licensed or required to be licensed 
under Sections 5-101, 5-102 or 5-301 [625 ILCS 5/5-101, 625 ILCS 5/5-102 or 625 ILCS 5/5-
301] who knowingly fails to record on a Uniform Invoice any of the information or entries 
required to be recorded by subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section, or who knowingly places 
false entries or other misleading information on such Uniform Invoice, or who knowingly fails to 
retain for 3 years a copy of a Uniform Invoice reflecting transactions required to be recorded by 
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subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section, or who knowingly acquires or disposes of essential 
parts without receiving, issuing, or executing a Uniform Invoice reflecting that transaction as 
required by subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this Section, or who brings or causes to be brought into 
this State essential parts for which the information required to be recorded on a Uniform Invoice 
is not recorded as prohibited by subsection (c) of this Section, or who knowingly fails to comply 
with the provisions of this Section in any other manner shall be guilty of a Class 2 felony. Each 
violation shall constitute a separate and distinct offense and a separate count may be brought in 
the same indictment or information for each essential part for which a record was not kept as 
required by this Section or for which the person failed to comply with other provisions of this 
Section. 
 
